Introduction
Marx did not develop a view of ethics. This, however, does not mean that Marxist ethics is impossible. This paper will question its possibility.
Hence, our regulative question in this paper is: How is Marxist ethics possible? An answer to this question will give us the claims one has to presuppose for developing a version of Marxist ethics. In short, it will determine, what we may call, 'the presuppositions of Marxist ethics.' This is the task of this paper, to provide us with at least some of these presuppositions. and bad, and attempts to develop a perspective that can lead us to a better life. Although Marx does not propose such a distinction, his target is morality rather than ethics. Marx took morality to be not only irrelevant to revolutionary practice but detrimental to its success. Morality, according to Marx, was ideological in the sense that it was constructed to protect the interests of the ruling class. This means that Marx was a relativist about morality and was not interested in developing an ethical perspective that can break through this relativity. There is nothing contradictory in claiming that morality is relative, but ethics is not. The fact that moral norms change from culture to culture does not mean that there cannot be ethics. Realism about ethics is still possible. 3 Hence, our answer to our initial question is that there can be a Marxist theory of ethics compatible with what Marx said about morality.
It is beyond the task of this paper to develop a Marxist theory of ethics. Our concern here is not to evaluate contemporary attempts either.
We are rather interested in developing some tools for evaluating these kinds of approaches in general. In this direction, we aim to lay out the presuppositions of developing a Marxist theory of ethics. Accordingly, our original question "How is Marxist ethics possible?" can be elaborated as: "What kind of outlook should an ethical perspective have in order to order to achieve a better vision of truth. We shall try to correct the mistakes of our intellectual ancestors and to improve their view. The original thinkers, namely, philosophers, are our common intellectual ancestors of humanity. They achieved the level of universality, which is the target of all students of philosophy. This is our duty as students: We shall have something more to say to our students than what we learned from our teachers. ble?" We will argue that it is not. Marxist ethics, if it is to be meaningful, should be relevant to revolutionary practice. And for it to be relevant, it should be utopian rather than scientific. But it is well known that Marx was against utopian socialism and Engels sharpened the contrast between utopian and scientific socialism. We shall first examine Marx's and Engels' criticism of utopian socialists, which will be the subject of section one. Then we will turn back to our main question, namely, "How is Marxist ethics possible?" In response, we will argue that the more scientific a
Marxist thesis claims to be, the less space is left for the ethical in revolutionary practice. This means that any Marxist attempt to develop a view of ethics is destined to be utopian rather than scientific. This entails that
Marxist ethics is possible only through endorsing a version of utopian Marxism, which will be the conclusion of second section. In the final section, we will further discuss how a Nietzschean perspective might help us to develop such a utopian Marxist theory of ethics. A utopian Marxist theory of ethics presupposes that ethical revolution, a revolution that leads to a better life, requires a vision of utopia. Accordingly, we can call an ethical revolution that is based on a vision of utopia a 'utopian revolution.' Therefore, the regulative question of our last section is "How is utopian revolution possible?" Utopian revolution is the conscious attempt of human beings to change the political realm according to a vision of utopia. Hence, the possibility of a utopian revolution is the primary question for any thesis of Marxist ethics. Now, the possibility of utopian revolution presupposes the existence of agents who are able to carry out that revolution. Hence, the question concerning how utopian revolution is possible presupposes that we have an answer to the Nietzschean question: "Who is able to carry out a utopian revolution?" After answering this question from a Nietzschean perspective, we will leave the task of fully elaborating such a Marxist theory of ethics to future studies, for it is beyond the limits of this paper.
Marx's and Engels' Criticism of Utopian Socialism
For understanding Marx's and Engels' criticism of utopian socialism, we should first look at the views of the utopian socialists, namely, Saint The Utopian founders of sects ... [described] ... the goal of the social movement, the supersession of the wages system with all its economic conditions of class rule ... From the moment the working men's class movement became real the fantastic utopias evanesced -not because the working class had given up the end aimed at by these Utopians, but because they had found 4 For instance, Saint Simon claims: "One concludes necessaily that physiology of which the science of man is part, will be treated by the method adopted for the other physical sciences" (quoted from Durkheim's Socialism and Saint Simon, 63) . Owen claims: "The present essays therefore are not brought forward as mere matter of speculation, to amuse the idle visionary..." "I have thus given a detailed account of this experiment... without this, particular facts may indeed amuse or astonish, but they would not contain substantial value which the principles will be found to possess" (A New View of Society and Other Writings, 63; 79) . Also, Fourier claims:" I continue my discussion of the filiation of the new sciences. I soon recognized that the laws of passionate attraction were in complete accord with the laws of material attraction as explained by Newton and Leibniz, and there was a unified system of movement governing the material world and the spiritual world... Thus a new exact science was discovered. I advanced into a new scientitic world. The socialist and communist systems, properly so called, those of SaintSimon, Fourier, Owen, and others, spring into existence in the early undeveloped period, described above, of the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie (see Section I: Bourgeois and Proletarians).
The founders of these systems see, indeed, the class antagonisms, as well as the action of the decomposing elements in the prevailing form of society.
But the proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the spectacle of a class without any historical initiative or any independent political movement. Since the development of class antagonism keeps even pace with the development of industry, the economic situation, as they find it, does not as yet offer to them the material conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. They therefore search after a new social science, after new social laws, that are to create these conditions. (Marx and Engels 2008, 78) Even Marx and Engels do not claim here that utopian socialists did not target developing a social science. They rather argue that the scientific approach of utopian socialists was misdirected, due to the lack of They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favoured. Hence, they habitually appeal to society at large, without the distinction of class; nay, by preference, to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they understand their system, fail to see in it the best possible plan of the best possible state of society?
Hence, they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel. (Marx and Engels 2008, 79) Finally, Marx and Engels criticize the disciples of utopian socialists for their experiments with small-scale communities. As it is evident from the quotation below, Marx and Engels see these attempts not only as wasteful but also troublesome, for they prevent revolutionary political activity.
Therefore, although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, is pregnant." (Marx and Engels 2009, 42) . Introducing utopia as the best possible society is the same as introducing an ethical approach to revolutionary practice. As Vincent Geoghegan rightly claims "Utopia can be seen as the good alternative, the outline of a better future, an 'ought' to the current 'is'." (Geoghegan 2008, 16 Communism is quite incomprehensible to our saint because the communists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to egoism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically either in its sentimental or in its high-flown ideological form; they rather demonstrate its material source, with which it disappears of itself. The communists do not preach morality at all, as Stirner does so extensively. They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as much as selflessness, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals. (Marx and Engels 1998, 264) The communists do not preach morality mainly because morality for Marx and Engels expresses the interests of the dominant class. They consider morality to be relative. Engels explains further in Anti-Dühring:
We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and forever immutable ethical law on the pretext that the moral world, too, has its permanent principles which stand above history and the differences between nations. We tagonisms, morality has always been class morality; it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or, ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has represented its indignation against this domination and the future interests of the oppressed. That in this process there has on the whole been progress in morality, as in all other branches of human knowledge, no one will doubt. (Tucker (Editor) 1978, 726) Furthermore, revolutionary practice does not require any ethical initiative if materialism is taken to be the motor of historical progress. In
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific Engels explains:
Hegel had freed history from metaphysics -he had made it dialectic; but his conception of history was essentially idealistic. But now idealism was driven from its last refuge, the philosophy of history; now a materialistic treatment of history was propounded, and a method found of explaining man's "knowing" by his "being," instead of, as heretofore, his "being" by his "knowing."
From that time forward socialism was no longer an accidental discovery of this or that ingenious brain, but the necessary outcome of the struggle between two historically developed classes-the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Its task was no longer to manufacture a system of society as perfect as possible, but to examine the historical-economic succession of events from which these classes and their antagonism had of necessity sprung, and to discover in the economic conditions thus created the means of ending the conflict. But the socialism of earlier days was as incompatible with this materialistic conception as the conception of Nature of the French materialists was with dialectics and modern natural science. (Tucker (Editor) 1978, 699-700)
As Engels explicitly claims above, the problem with the utopian socialists is their idealist conception of a social movement, for "the socialism of earlier days was incompatible with this materialistic conception."
According to Marx and Engels, the materialist mentioned above concep- However, because men pay ever greater attention to economic factors, it can easily seem as if these factors play a greater role today than they did before.
This, however, is not the case... the level of economic development reached today leave ideological and ethical factors greater scope for independent activity than was formerly the case... In this way, the 'iron necessity of history' is curtailed... (Bernstein 1993, 19-20) In response, Rosa Luxemburg in her article "Reform or Revolution"
accuses Bernstein of being an idealist:
What, in that case, is the basis of Bernstein's program for the reform of society? Does it find support in definite tendencies of capitalist production?
No. In the first place, he denies such tendencies. In the second place, the socialist transformation of production is for him the effect and not the cause of distribution. He cannot give his program a materialist base, because he has already overthrown the aims and the means of movement for socialism, and therefore its economic conditions. As a result he is obliged to construct himself an idealist base. (Luxemburg 2008, 84) This idealist base is Bernstein's concern for the relevance of an ethical approach to revolutionary practice. Luxemburg argues that such an ethical outlook is idealist, for it does not recognize the economic necessity, the materialist basis of revolution:
"Why represent socialism as the consequence of economic compulsion?" he complains. "Why degrade man's understanding, his feeling for justice, his will?" (Vorwarts, March 26, 1899). Bernstein's superlatively just distribution is to be attained thanks to man's free will, man's will acting not because of economic necessity, since his will itself is only an instrument, but because of The basic categories of Marxist philosophy (dialectical materialism) are materialism and dialectic. Materialism is based not on the ideological notions of Subject and Object, but on the distinction between matter and thought, the real and knowledge of the real -or, to put it differently and more precisely, the distinction between the real process and the process of knowledge; on the primacy of the real process over the process of knowledge... The dialectic determines the laws which govern these processes In this context, 'utopian' and 'ethical' are interchangeable concepts. This is because, as we have explained before, an ethical vision of a better society in the future is called a utopian vision. 9 Here again, we need to distinguish between the view of Nietzsche and a Nietzschean view. The latter is a thesis that tries to improve Nietzsche's ideas. In this sense, it is a new perspective, for it attempts to re-organize the outlook of Nietzsche's various ideas. This new view is inevitably not Nietzsche's own view and it does not claim to present Nietzsche's own view. It is not interested in finding out what exactly Nietzsche 'intended' to say. For one, it does not doubt that Nietzsche's intention was to present the truth as he saw it. Hence, given our perspective of truth, how can we re-organize Nietzsche's ideas so as to present truth better? This is our question. And our intention in this section is to present a perspective that re-organizes Nietzsche's ideas in a new manner. Thus, we hope to achieve a better understanding of truth rather than a better understanding of the B e y t u l h i k m e 8 ( 1 ) Who is able to create a better way of distributing political power?
The ancient philosophers of Greece, and Nietzsche were right. It is the healthy people, both in body and soul, the blessed, the noble. 10 Economic conditions, however, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the possibility of revolution for establishing such a political organization. It is people's understanding and will to be good, that is required. 11 We human beings are free animals, or we can become human to the extent that we are free. If we are to be determined by economic necessity, then we will be reduced to the position of (a merely more complicated) animal.
Returning to our crucial question of this section, that is, 'Who is able to carry out a utopian revolution?', a mainstream Marxist and our 
